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考研英語同源閱讀時文精選
考研英語時文精選“今日關(guān)注”——同源閱讀時文精選
今日關(guān)注：國際經(jīng)濟之所謂貨幣戰(zhàn)爭
如今中國想進入高附加值產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)業(yè)的行列，就意味著下一階段的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展需要在人才上投放更多的資源，官方已經(jīng)明確表態(tài)，他們將以建設(shè)高速公路的決心來建設(shè)人才隊伍。自1998年以來，北京已經(jīng)大規(guī)模地將資源投放到教育上，投放總額接近GDP總量的三倍。近十年來，中國的高等院校已經(jīng)翻番，學(xué)生增加五倍，從1997年的100萬增加到2007年的550萬。中國遴選出9所頂級高校組成中國版的常春藤。當(dāng)歐洲和美國的大學(xué)受到大規(guī)模減免預(yù)算的沖擊時，中國反其道而行之。今年早些時候，耶魯大學(xué)校長Richard Levin在一次演說中指出：“中國高校的擴充規(guī)模史無前例，她僅用10年的時間，就建立了世界上最大規(guī)模的高校體系。自新千年以來，中國大專院校學(xué)生所增加的人數(shù)超過美國同類別學(xué)生的總數(shù)�！�
這種對教育空前的投入，對中國還有美國意味著什么？諾貝爾經(jīng)濟學(xué)獎獲得者、芝加哥大學(xué)教授Robert Fogel預(yù)測，受過良好培訓(xùn)的工人對經(jīng)濟影響深刻。在美國，與一個受過9年義務(wù)教育的工人相比，一個高中畢業(yè)生的產(chǎn)能是其1.8倍，大學(xué)畢業(yè)生是其3倍。中國正在不斷地擴充其高中和大學(xué)畢業(yè)生的人數(shù)。中國的服務(wù)業(yè)與印度相比還有相當(dāng)大的差距，因為印度學(xué)生的英語和技術(shù)培訓(xùn)更占優(yōu)勢。但中國的公司最終將打入這片廣闊的領(lǐng)域，因為中國學(xué)生的語言能力和技能培訓(xùn)正在逐步提高。Fogel相信，隨著中國高技術(shù)工人的增加，中國經(jīng)濟的年均增長率將大幅度增長，到2040年，其GDP將會去到令世人驚嘆的123萬億美元。按他的預(yù)測，屆時中國將成為全球最大的經(jīng)濟體。
不能靠“威脅和關(guān)稅”回擊
不管這個不可思議的數(shù)字是否正確（我認為Fogel對中國的增長過分樂觀），但毫無疑問的是，中國正在向上游產(chǎn)業(yè)和高附加值的工作轉(zhuǎn)移，這些領(lǐng)域直到現(xiàn)在還在被西方國家認為是他們的專利，這才是來自中國的真正挑戰(zhàn)。這不是因為北京操控匯率或暗中補貼，而是中國戰(zhàn)略投資和中國人刻苦耐勞形成的挑戰(zhàn)。對這種挑戰(zhàn)最有力的回擊不是威脅和關(guān)稅，而是深度的結(jié)構(gòu)改革以及新的重點投資，使得美國的經(jīng)濟更有活力，美國工人更具競爭力。這需要民主和共和兩黨達成共識。
在以美國次貸危機引發(fā)的世界金融危機和經(jīng)濟危機爆發(fā)以來，世界各國的匯率隨金融市場的波動而劇烈波動，給各國的經(jīng)濟穩(wěn)定帶來極大的不利影響。特別是后危機時代美國經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇緩慢，失業(yè)嚴重，美國國會少數(shù)議員為了轉(zhuǎn)移國內(nèi)視線，無端指責(zé)中國操縱人民幣匯率，以人民幣匯率大幅低估來獲取貿(mào)易順差。上月底，美國眾議院甚至通過試圖以貿(mào)易制裁中國壓迫人民幣大幅升值的法案。近期，美國通過量化寬松貨幣政策誘使美元對世界各國貨幣大幅度貶值，一場新的貨幣大戰(zhàn)或隱或現(xiàn)。美國國會不斷向中國施壓，要求人民幣升值。美國財政部還要求國際貨幣基金組織進行干預(yù)，以促使中國實施靈活的匯率政策。巴西、日本和其他亞洲經(jīng)濟體的各央行也已為穩(wěn)定本國貨幣而出手干預(yù)。為了及時準(zhǔn)確地反映人民幣綜合匯率的整體走勢，以客觀的事實和科學(xué)的依據(jù)為國家制定匯率政策，為企業(yè)、機構(gòu)和個人規(guī)避匯率風(fēng)險，正確引導(dǎo)公眾的匯率預(yù)期，開發(fā)人民幣匯率指數(shù)具有重要現(xiàn)實意義和戰(zhàn)略意義。
The global economy
How to stop a currency war
Keep calm, don’t expect quick fixes and above all don’t unleash a trade fight with China
Economist Oct 14th 2010
IN RECENT weeks the world economy has been on a war footing, at least rhetorically. Ever since Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, declared on September 27th that an “international currency war” had broken out, the global economic debate has been recast in battlefield terms, not just by excitable headline-writers, but by officials themselves. Gone is the fuzzy rhetoric about co-operation to boost global growth. A more combative tone has taken hold. Countries blame each other for distorting global demand, with weapons that range from quantitative (量的;用量表示的;與數(shù)量有關(guān)的) easing (printing money to buy bonds) to currency intervention and capital controls.
Behind all the smoke and fury, there are in fact three battles. The biggest one is over China’s unwillingness to allow the yuan to rise more quickly. American and European officials have sounded tougher about the “damaging dynamic” caused by China’s undervalued currency. Last month the House of Representatives passed a law allowing firms to seek tariff protection against countries with undervalued currencies, with a huge bipartisan(兩個政黨的) majority. China’s “unfair” trade practices have become a hot topic in the mid-term elections.
A second flashpoint is the rich world’s monetary policy, particularly the prospect that central banks may soon restart printing money to buy government bonds. The dollar has fallen as financial markets expect the Federal Reserve to act fastest and most boldly. The euro has soared as officials at the European Central Bank show least enthusiasm for such a shift. In China’s eyes (and, sotto voce, those of many other emerging-market governments), quantitative easing creates a gross distortion in the world economy as investors rush elsewhere, especially into emerging economies, in search of higher yields.
A third area of contention comes from how the developing countries respond to these capital flows. Rather than let their exchange rates soar, many governments have intervened to buy foreign currency, or imposed taxes on foreign capital inflows. Brazil recently doubled a tax on foreign purchases of its domestic debt. This week Thailand announced a new 15% withholding tax for foreign investors in its bonds.
Jaw-jaw, please
For now, these skirmishes fall far short of a real currency war. Many of the “weapons” look less menacing on closer inspection. The capital-inflow controls are modest. In the rich world only Japan has recently resorted to currency intervention, and so far only once. Nor is there much risk of an imminent (危險等逼近的;即將發(fā)生的)descent into trade retaliation(報復(fù)). Even in America, tariffs against China are still, with luck, a long way off—both because the currency bill is milder than it sounds and because it has yet to be passed by the Senate or signed by Barack Obama.
Still, there is no room for complacency(滿足;自滿) Today’s phoney war could quickly turn into a real dogfight. The conditions driving the divergence(分歧) of economic policies—in particular, sluggish（怠惰的 ）growth in the rich world—are likely to last for years. As fiscal austerity（樸素, 節(jié)儉；苦行）kicks in, the appeal of using a cheaper currency as a source of demand will increase, and the pressure on politicians to treat China as a scapegoat will rise. And if the flood of foreign capital intensifies, developing countries may be forced to choose between losing competitiveness, truly draconian（古代執(zhí)政官的, 嚴峻的）capital controls or allowing their economies to overheat.
What needs to happen is fairly clear. Global demand needs rebalancing, away from indebted rich economies and towards more spending in the emerging world. Structural reforms to boost spending in those surplus economies will help, but their real exchange rates also need to appreciate（增值）. And, yes, the Chinese yuan is too low. That is hurting not just the West but also other emerging countries (especially those with floating exchange rates) and indeed China itself, which needs to get more of its growth from domestic consumption.
It is also clear that this will not be a painless process. China is right to worry about instability if workers in exporting companies lose their jobs. And even reasonable choices—such as the rich world’s mix of fiscal austerity and loose monetary policy—will have an uncomfortable impact on small, open emerging economies, in the form of unwelcome capital inflows. This flood of capital will be less devastating to them than the harm they would suffer if the West descended into deflation（通貨緊縮）and stagnation, but it can still cause problems.
Collective Seoul-searching
All this cries out for a multilateral approach, in which institutions such as the IMF and the G20 forge consensus among the big economies. The hitch is that the multilateral route has, so far, achieved little. Hence the chorus calling
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